Abstract:
Temporal consciousness is philosophically problematic because it appears to have features that cannot be analyzed in a way compatible with the fundamental view of time as a one-dimensional order of events. For example, it seems to be a manifest fact of experience that within a strictly present state of consciousness one can be immediately aware of a succession of events, yet the standard view of time denies that successive events can co-exist, so how can they be given together in a present perceptual state? Such puzzles have occasionally led philosophers to reject scientific or mathematical theories of time. Some time ago C. D. Broad developed a largely unappreciated theory of temporal cognition to cope with these puzzles. In this paper the evolution of Broad's theory is traced, and it is defended from the misinterpretations of later critics. Finally, it is suggested that a modification of Broad's theory, which frees it from the trappings of sense-data epistemology, shows it to be compatible with sane current naturalistic approaches to experience that also would need to account for temporal experience within the framework of scientific time.
do violence both to the supposed veracity of inmediate experience and to the minimal logic of a one-dimensional ordering: events that are successive can't be simultaneous.2 Nonetheless, in spite of the epistemological-metaphysical puzzles that can be seen to infect temporal experience, philosophers have too often assumed that temporal experiences as given might be used to help decide larger issues concerning the nature of time or mind. For example, since Bergson it has been a recurrent theme in various quarters that, because science cannot consistently account for the way we experience temporal phenomena, the mathematical, scientific view of time (and of the world in that time) is merely an instrumental fiction, or, that the mind must be quite different from natural objects that do happen to inhabit the scientific temporal order.3 Hence, the puzzles of temporal consciousness continue to stand as specific challenges both to scientific realism and to naturalistic theories of mind. This situation is made all the more serious because philosophically facile treatments of "subjective time" have made their way into some recent scientific literature.Ŝ ome time ago C. D. Broad developed an ingenious theory of temporal consciousness that might be modified so that it could play an in structive role in future attempts to account for temporal experience within the framework of scientific time. His theory attempted to do justice to much of the epistemic integrity of ordinary temporal per ception while also granting ontological primacy to a more rigorous conception of time. Unfortunately, Broad's theory is largely unap preciated today because it developed by stages in writings scattered throughout his career, and, because the significance of these different stages has been seriously misunderstood by his critics. It is the aim of this paper to remedy this situation by tracing the strategic evo lution of Broad's theory, by answering his critics, and by offering a more constructive évaluâtion. presented in both areas that were embarrassing coninon sense: idealists such as McTaggart had argued that time is paradoxical and therefore unreal; meanwhile, physicists were postulating a continuum of events having temporal characteristics seemingly alien to those of ordinary experience. Broad focused his attention on the experience of time in the hope that a careful analysis of this experience would lead to definitions of temporal concepts which would be enpirically anchored and which would avoid McTaggart's paradoxes. Also, he hoped that the physicists' conception of time could be understood (defined) in terms of this same experiential basis so that one could be assured that the time of physics is significantly related to the time of experience.B road's strategy in ST is to try to show that ordinary concepts of time and space are themselves "extraordinarily remote" from the "crude facts of sense-experience, from which they must have been gradu ally elaborated" (ST, p. 5). For, if this is so, then "the hold of tradition is loosened; and we are prepared to consider alternative, and possibly more satisfactory, conceptual syntheses of sensible facts" (ST, p. 5). Though Broad claims that such concepts are remote fron experi ence, he is, nevertheless, in the enpiricist tradition which insists that they must be rooted in the sensible features of experience. Both conceptual and epistemic priority are assigned to judgments about the immediate, sensuous character of experience. Thus, the way to clarify the status of various views about time would be to "try to point out the sensible and perceptible facts which underlie the highly abstract concepts of science, and the cruder, but still highly sophisticated concepts of cannon sense" (ST, p. 5) • And, as an enpiricist, Broad more or less takes it for granted that one can inmediately read-off the properties of sense experience. So, in ST, Broad's treatment of temporal experience is intended to be primarily a descriptive prelude to a metaphysical discussion concerning the status of time. He later realizes (by the time of his Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy) that temporal consciousness is fraught with its own distinctive problems, and he is forced then to devise what is, in effect, a sophisti cated theory of temporal experience. Understanding Broad's later theory will, however, be facilitated by contrasting it with his early account.
Broad's description of temporal phenomena in ST is influenced by then prevailing sense-data theories of perception and by some interpretations of the new relativistic physics. He hopes to contribute to an enpiricist foundation for the new physics by showing how concepts of time and space spring from the sensible characteristics of sensa, but these sensa are quite different from Hume's fleeting impressions of sense. A sensum is defined as part of a sensible field, and a sensible field is, according to Broad, "a four-dimensional spatio-temporal whole" (ST, p. 35*0• So, "in sensing it, we thus sense directly a four-dimensional whole with three spatial dimensions and one temporal" (ST, p. 410). It would seem that Broad's conception of sensa was influenced by the interpretation of relativistic physics which recommends that one view ordinary physical objects as really being parts of four-dimensional spatio-temporal wholes. This is convenient, for, if sensa come with the crucial spatiotemporal features of the physicists' world built-in, then Broad's attempt to account for scientific concepts of these features is made easier than it would be if he had only fleeting, momentary sensa with which to work.
It is important to appreciate the literalness of Broad's claim that sensa are spatio-temporal wholes, since this position, along with Broad's early view of time, determines what he initially takes to be problematic about consciousness of temporal phenomena. Broad apparently took seri ously what is sometimes called the "block universe" interpretation of relativity according to which four-dimensional entities are wholes existing "all at once", in some supra-tenporal sense. More precisely, the universe, including sense-histories, is an ever growing block, for, in Broad's early version, future events do not exist until they are added as parts to the four-dimensional whole consisting of earlier events: "When Queen Anne's death became, it came into relations with all that had already become, and to nothing else, because there was nothing else for it to be related to. All these relations it retains henceforth forever" (ST. p. 8l). Now, it is because past and present events are supposedly both parts of an "enduring" whole that Broad believes one can be directly acquainted with them:
.. .we can be directly acquainted only with something, not a mere non-entity. On our view we cannot stand in the relation of direct acquaintance to future events, for the same reason which prevents us from robbing a Highlander of his breaks. We can stand in this relation to present events (in senseawareness) and to past events (in genuine memory), because such events are parts of the sum total of existence when the cognition in question takes place. (ST, p. 79«) In this context, Broad does not view the present, ostensibly direct acquaintance with temporally extended sensa, including their past parts, as problematic. They simply are parts of sense-fields,' so one can sense them as directly as one can sense anything else. Indeed, Broad imagines a "hypothetical observer who would sense the whole of his past history at every moment" (ST, p. 362). This would not be too surprising if, "As already explained, nothing that has ever existed really ceases to exist" (ST, p. 3^7). What is problematic for Broad, at this point in the evolution of his theory, is to account for the awareness of change and to define temporal concepts in terms of what he believes really exists and is vendically sense-given: temporally extended wholes. In ST Broad is eager to claim that strictly momentary (punctal) events are mere abstractions, or idealizations, which ought to be defined away in terms of a special series of sets of temporal durations (Whitehead's method of Extensive Abstraction (ST, p. 350)).
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To this end, Broad presents a diagram representing the history of acts of sensing and their relations to sensible fields:
The parallel horizontal |ines represent 0's mental acts and 0's sensible fields. The intervals ti -ti = t£ -t2 * f , which, Broad takes to be the duration of 0's "specious" present. Any particular act of sensing, 0n , has as its objects all the sensa within an interval of length 7 . All acts of sensing that are separated by temporal intervals less than T can have some sensa sis common objects. The closer the acts, the more sensa they will share; the farther apart, the fewer they will share. In ST Broad believes that this sharing of objects allows one to sense change because sane temporally extended sense field can be sensed "...through out a finite process of sensing. Thus the qualitative differences be tween its earlier and its later sections will be sensed together; i.e. the observer will not merely notice that something has changed" (ST, p. 353). This ability to sense change is the heart of Broad's early account, for he feels that it provides the qualitative basis for saying that one part of a sense-field is earlier than another part, and, hence, it yields the empirical material for defining temporal concepts, (ST, pp.
351-353).
Broad's early theory deserves only two short critical remarks. First, though he uses the term 'specious present' his theory is not a theory of the specious present. This term was originally coined by a psycho logist, E. Clay, and used by William James, to contrast the durational contents of experience with what was taken to be the genuine present, namely, a strictly momentary present.® In other words, it referred to a duration that was usually thought to be present, but which could 
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not really be present. Now, by saying that a duration within a "specious present" becomes present as a whole, and by claiming that these durations are given veridically as so becoming, Broad is, in effect, claiming that neither the specious present nor what one is given within the specious present are speciously present: "...on the sensum theory, sensa have all the qualities that they appear to have," and presumably this includes their becoming present as durational wholes (ST, p. 369; cf. p. 6 9 ). Second, Broad leaves obscure how, exactly, his series of acts of sensing can add-up to a unified, phenomenologically authentic experience of temporality or change. Merely noting from a philosophical perspective that successive acts share some objects and differ in others does not explain how this similarity and difference is able to be registered in a present, unitary act of sensing, which is what Broad needs to support his thesis that one can sense change. However, Broad does not concern himself with the details of the durational character of acts of sens ing; he casually refers to them as processes, probably hoping that there is sufficient dynamism and continuity in the processes to get the job done. In any event, pursuing either of these critical remarks would be academic since Broad's later version of the theory differs in both aspects. Broad is not, of course, suggesting that there are no events which have duration. There are such events, but these events are to be construed as series of event-particles, each of which has absolutely determinate temporal position. Broad does not say whether he had any other reason for embracing event-particles. Perhaps, he also became disenchanted with Whitehead's method of Extensive Abstraction. In support of this possibility, it is interesting to note that Broad now thinks that con ceptions of the instantaneous can be rooted directly in terms of the given: "I think that some event-particles are boundaries of events. And I think that we are able to form the conception of event-particles because we often prehend events as having boundaries" (EM, p. 273).
II
In ST Broad had treated temporal consciousness as a comparatively unproblematic phenomenon, as something which might be used to deal with other philosophical problems. Now, after adopting a more rigorous view of time, he discovers that temporal consciousness involves its own special difficulties. First, he observes that the following propositions are "ccirsnonly taken to be self-evident": (i) Neither persistence without qualitative change nor quali tative change can be ascribed to a subject which is literally instantaneous. Both involve duration.
(ii) Anything which a person prehends at any moment must be present. (EM, p. 282.)
Broad then recognizes that if only the instantaneous can be present (the position to which he is now committed) "difficulties at once arise":
If anything which a person prehends at any moment must be present, it must be instantaneous. If it is instantaneous, it can neither persist without qualitative change nor suffer qualitative change. Yet prehended objects are prehended as persisting unchanged or as changing. Again, it seems evident frcm direct inspection that the objects which we prehend at any moment are not instantaneous event-particles. (EM, p. 282.) Broad proceeds to scorn psychological and philosophical theories which assert that "what is prehended at any moment must have 'presentness', in seme sense which does not entail instantaneousness and exclude duration, as presentness in the proper sense does" (EM, p. 282). In deed, "The doctrine of the Specious Present seems to be a verbal trick for evading these difficulties" (EM, p. 282). To the extent that his own earlier theory required sensings to be present in a non-instantaneous fashion, Broad would have to admit that his account of temporal experience in ST involved precisely this verbal trickery. Now, pending a solution of the puzzles of temporal experience which preserves the epistemic prowess of direct acquaintance, much of Broad's larger epistemology is in jeopardy. For, if the temporal appearing of sensa is incompatible with the nature of time, then the suspicion might arise that sensa are incapable of serving as a foundation for scientific concepts. Or, it might be suggested by a friend of McTaggart that time itself is not real. Neither alternative could have appealed to Broad. Since he realized that temporal consciousness becomes problematic primarily as a result of the requirement that present events be momen tary, Broad's central problem became: how can one maintain that sensa are verdically given as changing and as temporally extended if each act of sensing must be an instantaneous event, i.e., how is temporal experi ence veridically achieved in the momentary present?
As part of his overall effort to save temporal appearances, Broad proceeds to reject one of the propositions which he said is "commonly taken to be self-evident":
.. .1 propose to reject the proposition that anything which a person prehends at any moment must then be present. For it entails directly the false proposition that we prehend eventparticles and nothing else... I shall assume that what a person prehends at any moment is of finite duration, and therefore that only a single instantaneous cross-section of this total object can be present at that moment. (EM, pp.
282-283.)
Two preliminary comments are in order. First, the entailment Broad mentions is not as direct as he indicates, because it presupposes his newly adopted theory that the determinateness of temporal relations requires a punctal present. Second, as Broad uses the term 'prehend' in EM it has the same function which 'intuit' or 'sense' had in his earlier writings. McTaggart had used the term 'perception' to cover every instance of acquaintance with particulars, but Broad wants to have a convenient way to distinguish perception, where this involves the successful cognition of material objects, e.g., from the purely intuitive and immediate "perception" of such entities as images and sensa. So, Broad proposes to "substitute the artificial term Pre hension for 'perception' when used in McTaggart's extended sense [i.e., the sense in which it applies to cases of intuition] " (EM, p. *0.
Broad's abandonment of the proposition that anything which a person prehends at any moment must be present is a strategic sacrifice. It will be shown that he is giving up one manifest feature of experience D-2 so that he can try to hold onto others, namely, the ability to prehend change and duration. This maneuver represents a willingness to reject ordinary beliefs about what is given in favor of a philosophically motivated interpretation of the given. But as the theory becomes more complex, additional features call for explanation.
In The Mind and Its Place in Nature Broad had proclaimed that "It is the essence of a perceptual situation that it claims to reveal an object as It is at the time when the situation is going on.
Broad analyzes various cognitive achievements in terms of the obtaining of different kinds of metaphysical complexes -his so-called cognitive "situations," which consist of objective and subjective constituents standing in some particular cognitive relation. These situations can be more or less complex depending upon whether reference is made beyond the objective constituent to sane "epistemological object," and depending upon whether or not there is an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological object (see MPN, Chapter IV). For example, if one (the subjective constituent) looks towards the sky at night he may prehend a light sensum (the objective constituent) which, in perceptual judgment, is referred to a star (the epistemological object), and the perceptual judgment may or may not be true depending upon whether or not an onto logical object (a real star) exists corresponding to the epistemological object. Now, the reason it is the "essence" of a perceptual situation to claim to reveal an object as it is at the time when the situation is going on is that one ordinarily (pre-philosophically) takes the objective constituent (the sensum) to be, or to be a part of, the epistemological object, and the objective constituent must literally be a part of the perceptual situation "at the time when the situation is going on." In contrast, "it is the essence of a memory-situation that it claims to reveal an object as it was seme time before the memory-situation began" (MPN, p. 145), because, though the objective constituent (e.g., a memory image) is^ a part of the memory-situation, it is not taken to be, or to be a part of, the past epistemological object.
Broad's earlier position that the present has sane finite extension and that past events endure lent apparent plausibility to his prior assertion that past parts of temporally extended sensa can be constitu ents of present perceptual situations. Curiously, in spite of his changed view of time, he continues in EM to maintain that seme past events (some immediately past sensum-events) can be objective constitu ents of perceptual situations, i.e., that one can intuitively prehend recently past events. Though this may appear to be the most direct way to try to explain the experience of durational phenomena, it will be shown later that this feature of Broad's theory generates more problems than it solves. But supposing temporarily that one can stand in direct, sensuously cognitive relations to past sensa, how is one able to pre hend these sensa as temporally extended or as changing? Recall that in Broad's earlier theory the difference between the earlier and later portions of a sense-field can be discerned by sensing sensa change within the field: the earlier portions are simply those sensed before such irreducible qualitative change. This solution is no longer available to Broad if acts of prehension are momentary. Even if the prehended sensa stretch seme distance into the past, there is no time within any present momentary act to sense change within the field. There may be differences within the field so that, in terms of Broad's earlier distinction, one might be able to notice that change has occurred, but one would not be able to prehend the sensa changing.
In his new theory Broad seems, in response to this predicament, to back away fran his earlier claim that one can actually sense change. He introduces a new property, which he calls "presentedness'1, whose function is to serve as a temporal-position indicating cue. Presentedness is said to be a "psychological characteristic, which is capable of various degrees from zero up to a maximum" (EM, p. 282). That instantaneous cross-section of a sense-field which is present, and simultaneous with the act of prehension, has the maximum degree of presentedness, while "...the degree of presentedness possessed by cross-sections which are earlier than this one tails off to zero at the cross-section which forms the boundary between what P is just ceasing to sense and just beginning to retrospect" (EM, p. 283).
In the diagram, each triangle, such as A]_B]C]_, represents a speciouspresent situation, B]_ being the time of the act of prehension and A1B1 representing the time-interval prehended in the act (it is the interval that Broad can now consistently call the specious present). The height of a perpendicular on AjBi to line A1C1, for example, a2 a21> represents the degree of presentedness of the event that occurred at A2 as prehended at time (EM, p. 285).
According to the new theory, an event can be the objective consti tuent of several successive prehensions, and in each later speciouspresent situation it will be prehended with a lesser degree of pre sentedness than in earlier ones. This "steadily diminishing average degree of presentedness with which the phase is prehended is the sign and measure of its steady retreat into the more and more remote past" (EM, p. 288). Notice that Broad no longer says that one directly senses change itself; instead, one prehends degrees of presentedness, and these are taken as the sign and measure of change. Whereas Broad seemed, in ST, to take for granted the ability to be directly acquainted with the temporality of sensa, the situation is now much more complex, with presentedness playing a leading role: I take it that our prehension of the contents of each Specious Present as having presentedness is the experiential basis of our notion of presentness in the strict sense. Presumably the tailing-off in degree of presentedness to zero from the latest to the earliest boundary of the content of each Specious Present is one factor in the experiential basis of our notion of temporal transition. A second factor is the continuous series of over-lapping Specious Presents. And a third factor is the way in which a phase, short enough to be prehended as a temporal whole throughout a series of successive Specious Presents, steadily diminishes in degree of average present edness. .. (EM, p. 288.)
It will facilitate critical discussion to list now the manifest features of experience which Broad wants to explain and to outline his specific account of each.
(1) Experience can have seme duration (EM, p. 266). For Broad, all durational phenomena are to be analyzed as series of successive phases of a process, each of the phases (event-particles) having no duration. This analysis is also supposed to apply to the process of experience, where, the event-particles are momentary prehensions.
(2) Any two experiences of the same person stand to each other in a determinate form of a determinable temporal relation (EM, p. 266). The fact that experiences have duration (i.e., that they are sets of event-particles) means that the determinate temporal relations they have to one another are more complicated than the temporal relations between event-particles. For example, since experiences might overlap one could not, then, simply say either that they are simultaneous or that one is earlier than the other. But these more complicated re lations can, in the end, be understood in terms of strict presentness and the temporal relations of event particles. Thus, to say that one experience overlaps another would be equivalent to saying that the 658 D-5 later boundary (an event particle) of one experience is simultaneous with some phase of the other experience, but the earlier boundary is not simultaneous with any phase of the other experience (EM, p. 2 7 6 ). (4) Objects can be experienced as having duration, or as persisting (EM, p. 28I). 'The fact that one can perceive temporally extended phenomena as having duration is to be accounted for by one's ability to prehend what is immediately past. In the punctal present, one stands in a direct, sensuously cognitive relation (prehension) to recently past sensa: "...the prehended phase is completely past at the moment when it first begins to be prehended, and it is getting more and more remotely past throughout the period during which it continues to be prehended as a temporal whole" (EM, p. 288). Sensa can be directly experienced for a period up to the length of the specious present, and sensa having a duration up to the length of the specious present can be directly experienced as having that duration. The earlier parts of durational phenomena can be recognized as such by their having lesser degrees of presentedness than later parts. Basically, then, Broad's later account is true to the spirit of his earlier one: the fundamental goal is to show that experience is con sistait with the nature of time,especially as conceived by science, and this is to be accomplished by an empiricism which builds upon the reliability of what is immediately given within experience. Broad's new view of time has, however, resulted in several important modifi cations. A new property, presentedness, has come to play a crucial role in the experience of duration and succession; experience itself is said to consist of a series of momentary events; and, the belief that what is experienced must be present is rejected. Each of these modifications is a significant theoretical step beyond the ordinary, manifest features of tenporal consciousness. The concept of present edness is a technical innovation, difficult to interpret in experiental terms (Broad probably intended it to be analogous to the fading of an after-image), and the suggestion that experience consists of a conpact series of instantaneous events is not one that can be straightforwardly verified by inspecting sensa. So, if someone does not hold Broad's view of time, or, if one wants to try to save tenporal appearances in a way that will leave them in a more recognizable form, then it is not likely that he will be happy with Broad's theory.9 
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have qualities In the same way that spatial objects do. In the end, his distrust of momentary acts boils down to the fact that he does not think they can be used in a description of manifest temporal experience :
Broad seems to accept the doctrine ... as giving an accurate description of our direct experience of time. The effect on me is the exact reverse. It drives me to conclude that the doctrine of the specious present is untenable and sheds no light on our nonnal apprehension of temporal events. (DE, p. 311.) Mabbott goes on to claim that the way Broad tries to construct experi ence out of momentary acts is mistaken. Broad says that the series of specious-present situations is compact in the mathematical sense accord ing to which "Between any two specious presents there will always be an infinite number of others" (EM, p. 285). Mabbott responds by saying that he finds "it hard to believe that this is a description of our experience ..." (DE, p. 313). For, "... if Broad's analysis is accepted, we must say that a direct experience of a sound lasting say three seconds will be the awareness of an infinite set of overlapping specious presents" (DE, pp. 312-313). In any temporal interval one can, according to Mabbott, experience only a finite number of objects, and one is never aware of having lived through an infinite number of mental acts. In defense of Broad, it should first be noted that he never claims that one can prehend the punctal character of mental acts themselves, and, he never says that the objects of experience can be prehended as being infinite in number. Mabbott's confusion is caused partly by a genuine methodological tension in Broad's theory, one that is gener ated by the different characters Of the explanandum and the explanans: the manifest durational qualities found ba experience are different from those of experience considered as a series of successive, momentary phenomena. This tension can be lessened somewhat by noting that, with respect to our knowledge of the fine grain character of mental processes, Broad is closer to being a concept empiricist than either a judgment empiricist or a phencmenalist. That is, he is concerned with showing that the concepts used in his theory are capable of being defined, more or less ostensively, within experience; he does not always attempt to verify directly his theory simply by examining a succession of sensa or prehensions. Nor does he believe that the objects of knowledge must be reduced to the contents of sense experience, even when experience it self is the object of knowledge. For example, while ccxning to the cor>-clusion that momentary events are logically required by his view of time, Broad notes that the concept of a momentary event can be made empirically legitimate by observing the momentary boundaries of tempo rally extended events. Generally, once a concept gets its credentials within experience, Broad feels free to try to apply it to things that are not directly experienced (e.g., to such theoretical entities as electrons). Similarly, Broad tries to empirically ground the concept of a compact series by citing a case where one listens to shorter and more numerous clicks:
Moreover, if the objects of successive prehensions can overlap, as
We can think of the successive clicks as getting shorter and shorter and more and more numerous... Thus the later boundary of any click approaches nearer and nearer in temporal position to the earlier boundary of the next click. When the noise-process has became continuous we can think of the successive clicks as having approached to the limit of zero duration ... Thus we form the conception of a continu ous uniform noise-process as consisting of a conpact series of qualitatively similar event-particles, each with a different and absolutely determinate temporal position and without any duration. (EM, p. 276.) But neither their punctal character nor the conpactness of their suc cession is itself observed. After such concepts have been rooted in experiential terms, the empirical or philosophical cogency of theories which make use of these concepts is presumably determined by their ability to explain the manifest features which are given. So, contrary to Mabbott, it is likely that Broad does not intend his theory of temporal consciousness to be a mere description of temporal experience. Rather, it is meant to explain why such descriptions succeed to the extent that they do. Though Broad thinks the sensuous aspects of experience can be veridically intuited, he does not feel that ccmmon-sense judgments about the given should be taken at face value. Indeed, after exploring sane problems facing naively realistic theories of perception, he remarks : "Any theory that can possibly fit the facts is certain to shock cannon-sense somewhere; and in the face of the facts we can only advise cannon-sense to follow the example of Judas Iscariot, and 'go out and hang itself'" (MPN, p. 186). Broad would not, then, be too upset if his theory "falsifies experience," to use Mabbott's phrase, so long as what is falsified are unreflective common-sense beliefs about experience.
To be more specific about how Broad might respond, he could begin by saying that sensa can be veridically inspected in that if they are intuited as having seme quality then they do have that quality, but There is no reason to suppose that inspective Judgments are infallible in the sense of being exhaustive ... [For instanceJ we must not suppose then that, because we in spect a certain spatio-temporally extended whole, we there fore, ipso facto, have inspective knowledge of all or most of its parts... Moreover, a certain whole might have a certain characteristic and there might be a certain set of adjoined parts which make up this whole and do not have this characteristic. (MPN, pp. 300-301; cf. p. 467.) In this manner, to be temporally extended might be an inspectible property of sensa or of mental processes as wholes, and yet Broad could feel free to say that there are reasons for thinking that such wholes consist of parts which do not have this property and which are not them selves inspect ible. And, in EM Broad has basic reasons, pertaining to the nature of time, for saying that all temporally extended entities consist of momentary event-particles. In short, the momentary experiencings that really constitute "an experience" need never be given as the content of a prehension or introspection, yet they could still function as legitimate posits in Broad's theory. Not everything need be given or remembered, and this could include experiences.
• Broad might go on to argue that, instead of falsifying experience, his theory of temporal consciousness presents a more complete picture of mental processes. One may not be able to intuit momentary prehensions, but this is simply because they are below some psychological threshold; they are just too brief to be discerned individually in later acts (see MPH, p. 451). But they are genuine, and they constitute experience by being parts of a series. This need not mean that when one intuits experiences as having duration one is introspecting altogether delusive appearances. Rather, what one is vertically intuiting as having duration is a whole (a series) which happens to consist of momentary parts. The reason for believing that durational experiences have such punctal parts is not because these parts have been seen but because they play a role in a theory which, Broad hopes, can make intelligible the introspectible features of temporal experience.
In a similar fashion Broad could handle Mabbott ' s observation that one is not aware of a multitude (let alone an infinity) of mental acts or objects during any particular interval. He could claim the fact that one does not, and could not, intuit the full temporal complexity of experience stems from limits on the ability to introspect individual prehensions as such. No person may be able to introspect or remember the series of his own momentary prehendings as such a series, but this should not prevent one from postulating series as part of an explanation of experience.il Again, l-ktoe can still doubt, though, that a series must be compact to explain the apparent continuity of experience. It might just be that the gaps among a finite number of prehensions are too brief to be registered in consciousness.
Broad could argue that the fact one does not experience mental events in their multitude does not mean that what one does introspect is totally delusive. Mental processes may be given in some momentary acts of introspection as wholes, with properties they have as wholes, but this need not require the givenness of either the momentary parts of the introspected process or the givenness of the momentary character of the present act of introspection.
With respect to Mabbott's last criticism, (iii), Broad's response could be that during a specious-present Interval an object is, or can be, experienced repeatedly in a series of successive prehensions. But one need not be aware of this fact in any given experiential situation, for at any given time the prehended object is the object of just one act of prehension, and just once in that act. It might also be re membered as being the object of earlier prehensions, but it need not be: "...the occurrence of an experience in the past is never a suf ficient, even if it be a necessary, condition for the occurrence of a memory in the present" (MPN, p. 413). The fact that an event has been repeatedly experienced in many very recent prehensions need not enter any later consciousness. Contrary to Mabbott, there need be no experience of repetition. 
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merely represents the maximum degree of presentedness is not true. It is the line B]Ci that represents the maximum degree of presentedness, and Broad gives no indication that the whole specious-present situation represented by A-jC-iBn does not involve, as a component, a momentary act. On the contrary: "We can say that at any moment an instantaneous act of prehension grasps a total object which is not instantaneous but stretches back for a short period T" (EM, p. 321).
Once Mundle mistakenly thinks that Broad is committed to irreducibly durational mental acts, he is led to object that Broad's theory does not allow the precise dating of mental events, and, that it thereby gets "involved in a vicious infinite regress" (HS, p. 32). First, if experience is durational then it is spread out in time, and it becomes impossible to say that it happens at any one time. How, then, Mundle asks, are the phases of experience, which occur at different times, held together to constitute an experience? If each temporally extended object of experience must be synthesized by an act of experience, and if each act of synthesis is itself spread out in time (Mundle takes this to be Broad's position) then it, too, must be synthesized by sane other process, and so on. Thus Broad seems caught in an infinite re gress: each synthesis requiring another. Mundle's somewhat cryptic conclusion is that "'acts of sensing* ... do not fulfill the purpose for which they were introduced, i.e., to provide empirically respectable substitutes for mind-substances'" (HS, p. 32). Apparently, Mundle thinks that the holding together of the phases of experience must be accom plished by an enduring mind-substance, but he does not elaborate.
Mundle's objections are ill-conceived from the start. In EM, contrary to Mundle, Broad believes that momentary acts are metaphysically legiti mate. Indeed, Broad's theory of temporal consciousness seems tailored to be an example of how a process can be construed as a series of momentary events. So Broad would reject Mundle's assumption that an act of "synthesis" cannot be achieved instantaneously (Broad, however, does not himself use the term 'synthesis'). If each prehension can somehow reach out and achieve cognitive contact with temporally extended sensa, and this is Broad's claim, then the unity and identity of each prehension does not have to be guaranteed by any kind of metaphysical synthesis external to the series of momentary acts. Other questions might be raised about how earlier momentary prehensions affect later ones, and, whether Broad's account, relying solely as it does upon intuitive prehensions, can do justice to the experience of change, but Broad's theory is not vulunerable to Mundle's charges that it leaves experiences undatable and that it involves a vicious regress.
It should be reemphasized that one of the merits of Broad's mature theory is the extent to which it takes time seriously: since experience is itself subject to time, Broad comes to see that past experiences cannot be literal parts of present consciousness (though they might be the objects of current experience). The present perceptual experience of duration and change cannot consist of an earlier plus a later experience -it cannot be seme hybrid complex of experiences which have occurred at different times. Contrary to his earlier theory (and 666
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contrary to the spirit of Bergsonian conceptions of duration), Broad realizes that past experiencings do not constitute a part of present reality. Thus, if one perceives durational phenomena, the perception must be achieved, at any given time, by a consciousness which is com pletely present. Criticisms like Mabbott*s and Mundle's fail because they do not come to terms with Broad's argument that some cannon beliefs about temporal experience must, then, be mistaken. Accepting this consequence, Broad feels forced to take a closer look at strictly present experience and to try to find in it the marks which could be responsible for the temporal differentiation of perceived phenomena. V Though Broad's account becomes theoretical in the sense that he feels free to postulate mental processes whose fine-grain details are not introspectible, nevertheless, he is always guided by what he takes to be the given features of experience. Some mode of intuition reveals the phenomena to be explained, and some mode of direct acquaintance is supposed to reveal the qualities in terms of which the explanatory theory is to be constructed. So, sons momentary events and some degrees of presentedness of sensa are supposed to be given, even though the full complexity of the series acts of prehension may not be. Now, contrary to the critical strategies of Mabbott and Mundle, any defects in Broad's theory are probably traceable to his trying to give too much weight to phenomenal data, and, to his trying to make his theory look as if it were largely a product of inspection. This point is important because it is likely that the processes that constitute temporal consciousness are too complex to be understood in terms of the apprehended qualities of experience, yet Broad's theory might help explain these processes once the elements of his theory are freed from the straight-jacket of phe nomenal datumhood. Consider Broad's explanation of the perception of temporally extended processes in terms of the direct prehension of the past parts of these processes (see (4) above). Broad bends over backward to find sensedata support for this explanation, even though his motivation for the explanation is largely theoretical. Recall that he rejects "the pro position that anything which a person prebends mist be present ... tfor, given the theory of time, it entails) the false proposition that we prehend event-particles and nothing else" (EM, p. 282). So event B2 (Figure 2) is the only event that is strictly present when the prehension C2 occurs. But this position generates an epistemological problem for Broad: how is B]_, which occurs earlier than B2 , intuited as earlier than B2 ? When Bi is intuited along with B2 , why isn't Bi intuited as being simultaneous with B2 ? This is, after all, the ordinary (specious) interpretation of the situation. Broad, however, has a sense-data theorist's faith in the power of sensa-inspection to uncover sane characteristic of B]_ in virtue of which it could properly be seen as just past. The property Broad claims to discover is "presentedness":
can be intuited as being earlier than B2 because, when they are apprehended together, Bj can be seen to have a lesser degree of presentedness than B2 .
It is unlikely, however, that presentedness can do its job in the sinple way Broad expects, and this fact will call for a réévaluation of the role which he assigns to the givenness of sensible qualities. Even if there is a discernible quality like presentedness, why believe that Bi is earlier than B2 simply because it is intuited as having less presentedness than B2 ? Why not say instead that B]_ is simultaneous with B2 and simply has less presentedness than B2 ? In St Broad took it for granted that temporal relations can be sensed : "... various temporal relations between sensa of finite duration... can be and are directly sensed" (ST, p. 360). Clearly, as a result of his general epistemological commitments, Broad wants to continue to try to make temporal consciousness largely a matter of intuitive apprehension, where now it is lesser-degrees-of-presentedness rather than earlierthanness which is so apprehended. What Broad fails to appreciate is that, as far as mere direct acquaintance is concerned, the temporal locus of what has some given degree of presentedness is ambiguous. It is in the context of a theory of time such as Broad's that one is led to try to Interpret (conceptually) degrees of presentedness as signs of relative temporal location. Surely Bergson, Mabbott, and Mundle, being disposed towards different views of time, would be eager to inter pret the same "data" in some alternative way. Thus, to the extent that Broad presents his account of temporal consciousness as mainly a product of inspection of sensa he misrepresents its true status, and he makes it less plausible. More importantly, to the extent that he tries to make temporal experience primarily a matter of intuitive apprehension, he ignores the conceptual factors that are probably crucial for the constitution of temporal consciousness.
There is a more direct argument against Broad's theses that one can have direct sensuous contact with past sensa and that this intuition is the heart of temporal consciousness. As the direct objects of a veri dical mode of apprehension, sensa are supposed to have all the properties they appear to have, and, if apprehended sensa are apprehended as having different properties, then they cannot be the same sensa. Ironically, Broad used these principles in MPN to show that the direct object of memory cannot, in general, be the remembered event: in memory what one intuits (or Images) isn't the literal past event, for, what one Immedi ately intuits often has properties different frcm those of the past event (MPN, p. 257). Now, the same reasoning can be used to show that what is intuited to have different degrees of presentedness cannot be identical sensum-events : if E-as-intuited at-t2 has less presentedness than E-as-intuited at-tj then they cannot be the same sensum, since their determinate qualities differ, namely, their presentedness.
What Broad should have said is that different sensa can, at different times, be "referred to" or represent the same event. But, then, there is no motivation or need to say that one is directly acquainted with past sensa, and Broad could use the following alternative scheme.
Here, perception of recently past events A and E is accomplished by referring successive, strictly present sensa (such as S"(A) and S'(E)) to these events. The exact mechanism for this reference is, of course, still obscure. One does not consciously reason: S"(A) has less presentedness than S'(E), therefore A must have happened before E. Most likely, one has learned to respond conceptually to certain sensory patterns with judgments like "I saw E happen just after A." So con strued, the theory becomes neutral with respect to the issue whether the nexus between events and consciousness is intentional or causal, and, to whether the response is conscious or unconscious. For these reasons it can be hoped that Broad's theory might still provide a framework for a fuller scientific account of temporal cognition. 3
The advantage of this modification of Broad's theory is that it separates the insights of his account from his dubious phenomenal re construction of temporal experience. Broad's basic point is correct: if time is a one-dimensional order, and if one can experience temporally extended processes in the strict present, then temporal consciousness must involve sensory elements whose properties differ in such a way that they can function as cues signaling the tenporal order of the objects of experience. Broad's mistake was to insist that these sensory elements achieve this function by being given in some cognitive mode, and, to suggest that his theory is correct because these sensory ■'•^The modified theory can be seen to be compatible with recent "functionalist" attempts to offer a naturalistic analysis of mind. Broad can be seen as pointing to those strictly present properties of perceptual states which are such that they can play an appropriate role in tenporal cognition. 
